An important feature of the international nancial system is that it overwhelmingly uses a major currency, such as the US dollar, as a vehicle in the exchange between other currencies. In this paper we construct an equilibrium model to study this feature. The model economy has a nite number of countries, and each country's goods are sold only for the country's own currency. Households obtain foreign currencies at trading posts. Each post involves one pair of currencies, and there is a xed cost of operating the post. We study two types of equilibria. One is the symmetric trading equilibrium, in which there is an active post for every pair of currencies and so there is no vehicle currency. The other is the vehicle currency equilibrium, in which all countries exchange for a particular currency rst and then use that currency to exchange for other currencies. We analyze how the use of a vehicle currency changes each country's consumption and welfare, relative to the symmetric equilibrium. We study the constraints on the in ation rate of the vehicle currency that must be satis ed in order for a currency to be a robust vehicle currency.
Introduction
The international nancial system is very far from the ideal symmetric mechanism that is often described in theoretical models. Countries di er greatly in market size, nancial openness, and asset positions. One of the most obvious asymmetries in the nancial system concerns the role of currencies. In recent history, the US dollar has occupied a central role in the international economy. The dollar has acted as a international unit of account, in that it operates as an invoicing currency for commodity and asset trade, a store of value, in that o cial reserves assets of central banks are predominantly held in US dollars, and an international means of exchange, in that global foreign exchange transactions are overwhelmingly conducted using the US dollar on one side of the transaction.
In this latter role, the dollar acts as a`vehicle currency'
1 . In general bilateral markets for smaller country currencies are quite thin or even non-existent. To engage in currency trade between the currencies of small countries, generally the US dollar is used as a vehicle. We would expect this to generate e ciency gains if there are xed costs to setting up trading technologies. By having trade from many disparate country/currencies all go through one large currency market, the average cost of setting up trading technologies may be greatly reduced. On the other hand, it would seem to give the US dollar and US monetary policy a predominance over the rest of the world in a way that it would not necessarily always be bene cial, particularly in light of the fact that US monetary policy is focused on domestic rather than international goals.
This paper develops a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency.
We build a multi-country monetary exchange economy model , where each country's money is required to nance purchases in that country, through a cash-in-advance constraint. But 1 See Krugman (1979) , Hartman (1990) and Rey (1990) for discussion on the nature of a vehicle currency.
1 the way in which agents acquire foreign currencies may di er. We model foreign exchange trade as a costly process that takes place through`trading post' technologies. Trading posts have been modelled by Starr (2000) and Howitt (2005) . They represent locations where agents can go in order to buy or sell one currency for another; that is, they facilitate bilateral trade in currencies. In a purely symmetric world, there would be one trading post for all possible bilateral pair of currencies. Trading possibilities would be the same for the holders of any currency, so that currencies and countries would be treated equally. To address these issues, we explore the robustness of a vehicle currency equilibrium.
Given that a vehicle currency is in use, what factors might lead to its abandonment? One aspect of the`trading post' is that there are many Nash equilibria where agents will follow a particular trading pattern because they expect that all others will do so as well. But we can examine how robust these equilibria are to deviations, where a (large) group of agents choose a di erent trading pattern. We use this approach to ask how robust is a vehicle currency equilibrium to a deviation where all agents in two countries use their own currency to facilitate bilateral trade, but continue to use the vehicle currency for all other trade, and all other countries continue to the the vehicle currency for all trade. We nd that the vehicle currency is robust to deviations if it has the lowest rate of in ation among all countries.
There is a relatively small literature on the nature of an international currency. Krugman (1980) de nes a vehicle currency in the same way that is used here, within a partial equilibrium setting, and explores alternative trading patterns. Rey (2001) This di ers from ours principally in that we assume the existence of a cash-in-advance constraint for all goods purchases, but look speci cally at the nature of trade between currencies.
2
The next section sets out the basic model. Section 3 constructs an equilibrium where bilateral markets in all currencies exist. Section 4 constructs the vehicle currency equilibrium and compares it to the symmetric trading equilibrium. Section 5 explores the robustness of the vehicle currency equilibrium. Section 6 examines the sensitivity of the results to the trading assumptions. Some conclusions follow.
The Model

Technology and Preferences
Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0; 1:::. There are N 3 countries, indexed by i = 1; 2; ::N , and every country has the same population which is normalized to 1. Within a country, all households are alike. Each country has a given endowment of its own good, so each household in a country i is endowed with y it units of good i in period t. All goods are perishable within a period. A country i household's preferences are written;
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The parameter may be used to capture home preference. When = 1, consumption of home goods and all foreign goods are equally weighted. When < 1, there is a home good preference. Throughout the analysis, u(c) = ln(c) is assumed.
Each country has its own currency, and residents of a country receive lump-sum transfers only from their own country's monetary authority. Let M it be the total stock of currency i in period t and the gross rate of growth of currency i be it = M it =M it 1 . Each household in country i receives an amount, ( it 1)M it 1 , of currency i at the beginning of period t.
There are no scal transfers across countries. We normalize all nominal variables by the money stock of the relevant country. Lower case notation denotes normalized expressions.
Thus the normalize price level of good i is
, and normalized holdings of currency j by a country i household are
. Nominal exchange rates are normalized by the ratio of the stocks of two currencies involved.
Monetary Exchange at Trading Posts
We impose a cash in advance constraint at the national level. That is, purchases of country i's goods must use only currency i. 3 Therefore, in order to consume country j's good, a household in country i must obtain currency j. How currency trade takes place is the main focus of interest in the paper.
We assume that currency trade is organized in bilateral trading posts. That is, at a trading post, one currency is exchanged for another. There can be many agents on each side of a trading post. We order the two currencies at a post in ascending order and refer to a trading post with currencies k and j as post kj, where k < j.
Anyone can set up a trading post, but doing so involves xed costs. In order to set up trading post kj, the manager of a trading post must incur a xed cost y kt k in good k and y jt j in good j. There is also a cash-in-advance constraint on trading posts -the xed cost in each country's good needs to be paid in that country's money.
The managers of each trading post announce two prices for a pairwise trade, one for sale of a currency (ask) for another currency, and one for purchase (bid) of a currency for another currency. We assume that potential entry into a trading post leads each manager to follow a Bertrand pricing rule. In equilibrium the bid and ask prices announced by the manager of the trading post are just su cient to cover the xed costs of setting up the trading post, given the buyers and sellers of the currency pair in which the trading post operates. These prices then represent the equilibrium nominal exchange rates for each currency pair. With xed costs of setting up trading posts, there can be many Nash equilibria that di er from each other in the number of active posts. To see this, suppose that an agent believes that only a few other agents will go to a particular trading post. Then trading at that post will not be su cient to cover the xed cost, and so the agent will have no incentive to bring a currency to buy or sell at that trading post. In this case, the trading post will remain inactive.
We will focus on the equilibria that lie at the two ends of the spectrum. One is the Symmetric Trading Equilibrium (STE henceforth), in which there is a trading post for each pair of countries and there are N (N 1)=2 trading posts. The other is the Vehicle Currency Equilibrium (VCE henceforth), in which one currency is common to all trading posts, and there are only N 1 trading posts.
Of course it is unsatisfactory merely to focus on alternative equilibria, since using this criterion, it is hard to rule out any trading con guration, however ine cient. In light of this, we will investigate the robustness of the Vehicle Currency Equilibrium in a later section of the paper.
Timing of Events
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of a period, agents receive any unspent In the following analysis, we will suppress the time subscript t whenever possible and use the subscript n to stand for t n, where n 1. Denote the (normalized) nominal exchange rate for a buyer of currency j at a post kj as s
. This is the (normalized) amount of currency k required to purchase one unit of currency j at the post kj, or thè ask' price of j in terms of k. 
Symmetric Trading Equilibrium
In this section, we describe an equilibrium where all bilateral currency posts are open, and residents of each country engage in currency trade with all other countries in order to obtain the currency required to purchase the country's good. In this equilibrium, the household begins the period holding all of its own country's cash balances, and engages in trade in foreign currency markets with all other currencies to nance its imports. 5 The post kj is said to be active if at least one side of the post has a positive amount of currency, i.e., if 
Household Choices
Consider an arbitrary country i and let us examine the decision problem of a representative household in country i. For given money holdings, the household chooses a sequence
, to maximize U i subject to the following constraints: For a foreign currency j 6 = i, holdings at the beginning of the period consist of entirely the left-over currency in the last period, as described in (3.2).
The household then visits the N 1 currency trading posts ij (for i < j) and ji (for i > j), supplying respectively f of currency j. These constraints are described in (3.4) and (3.5) . In addition, the cash in advance constraint (3.6) must be satis ed for all goods.
We rst examine the optimal choices of households, taking exchange rates as given, and then look at equilibrium exchange rates which ensure that trading posts are viable in a Symmetric Trading Equilibrium. To proceed, we assume for this section is that all cashin-advance constraints are binding. 6 This means that, when households enter a period, they have no foreign currency left over and they hold the entire stock of domestic currency.
That is, m ij = 0 for all j 6 = i and so m ii = m i = 1. Because there is only one currency trading session per period, the households must visit all trading posts in order to ensure that they can consume all goods.
In Appendix A we show that optimal choices for household i give the conditions:
Because the household holds no foreign currency entering the period, consumption of a foreign good j must be nanced entirely by the amount of currency j that the household purchases in the current period. That is, f 
Now, substituting the rst-order conditions for consumption, we have: 
Exchange Rates and Consumption
There is a rm at each trading post ij. The rm sets prices s a ij and s b ij so as to just break even, after it incurs the xed cost y i i in good i and y j j in good j. The rm must pay these xed costs with currency. Hence, the rm must hold currency i in the (normalized) amount p i y i i and currency j in the amount p j y j j .
The implicit idea here is that if the rm were to make pro ts, then there is another rm in the background which would enter the ij trading post. So the rm engages in Bertrand pricing (see Howitt, 2005 , for a formalization of this assumption).
Exchange rates in trading post ij are set by the rm so as to satisfy two conditions.
The rst condition, determining the ask price of currency j, is written as:
This is explained as follows. In an STE, trading post ij receives total currency j payments of f ij jj (since only country j agents hold currency j in this equilibrium), and must hold currency p j y j j to pay the good j xed costs of setting up the trading post. It receives f ij ii deliveries of currency i from country i residents. It must set the asking price of currency j that country i residents will pay so that its holdings of currency j, in excess of its xed costs, are all paid out to country i households. From this condition, s a ij exactly satis es this property. 11
In a similar manner, to determine the bid price, s b ij , the trading post must satisfy the condition that deliveries of currency i made by country i households, less required currency holdings of p i y i i , must equal the deliveries of currency j by country j residents.
This condition is:
From the fact that all cash in advance constraints bind, in conjunction with market clearing, we have that m i = p i y i , so that p i = 1=y i , for all i. Using this in (3.12) and (3.13), and substituting the solutions for the currency trades f ij ii , we get (for i < j):
We impose the restriction max i i < 1 so that these solutions are meaningful. 7 Hence, the bid-ask spread at trading post ij under STE is
The bid-ask spread re ects the presence of trading costs. It is increasing in the cost parameters i and j . If the trading posts could operate without costs, so that i = 0 for all i, then the terms of trade between any two countries would be
, and the normalized exchange rate would be unity among all pairs of currencies. But with xed costs of setting up each trading post the ask price must exceed the bid price. To explain (3.14), note that agents in any country j will spend an amount 1 on each trading post that they visit, then the xed cost relative to the cash deliveries is j =( 1 ) = i . To break even, the trading post must ensure that the bid price of currency j for each currency i is reduced by this amount. A similar argument holds for the ask price. Put together, the bid-ask spread re ects the cost of the trading post in terms of both countries' good.
Recall that = 1 + N 1. Thus, a rise in N (the number of countries) or a fall in (the preference weight on foreign goods) reduces the share of the budget devoted to any one trading post, hence increases the xed cost per unit of currency trade in that post. As a result, these forces will increase ask exchange rates and reduce bid exchange rates. It is precisely the large trading costs in setting up bilateral foreign exchange trading posts with many countries that give rise to potential bene ts of a vehicle currency.
We calculate the consumption levels of a country i household. Substituting the solutions for exchange rates together into (3.10), (3.7) and (3.8), we get:
Each country i consumes a share 1=( ) of its own good, and (1 j )= of good j 6 = i.
The presence of trading costs in the currency market introduces an endogenous home bias in consumption, in addition to the home bias implied by preferences. Given the form of preferences and the trading cost technology, the STE has the property that the xed costs of setting up the ij trading post are fully borne by households of country i and j. The xed costs in terms of good j (i) are borne by country i (j).
Note that in the STE, consumption is independent of home or foreign country money growth. Money is completely neutral, and there are no international`spillovers' of monetary policy.
Finally, we check that cash in advance constraints indeed bind. Using the rst order conditions above, it is easy to establish that cash in advance constraints for each currency i will bind in a steady state if i > . 
Households' Decisions
When currency 1 is a vehicle currency, residents of all other countries i > 1 must engage in two foreign exchange transactions in order to consume goods other than their own or country 1's good. This means that, from the time of their decision to consume an additional unit of these goods, they must wait one period for consumption to take place. Because there is only one round of trading in the currency market in each period, to obtain other currencies j 6 = i; 1, a household in a peripheral country i (6 = 1) must carry a positive amount of the vehicle currency between periods. That is, m i1 > 0 for all i 6 = 1 (and so m 11 < 1). This means that the cash in advance constraint on currency 1 does not bind for the peripheral countries. In contrast, for the VC country, the cash in advance constraint on currency 1 binds.
Moreover, the cash in advance constraints on all non-vehicle currencies bind for all countries, as in the previous section. Thus, m ij = 0 for all i 6 = j and j 6 = 1, and m ii = m i = 1 for all i 6 = 1.
The decision problem facing country 1 is identical to that described above, because country 1 has active trading posts with all other countries. For country i > 1, the dynamics of money holdings are still given by (3.1) and (3.2), and the cash in advance constraints by (3.6). However, the other constraints are modi ed as follows: In Appendix A, we show that the optimal choices of a peripheral country i household yield the following conditions: Hence, there are three basic features of the vehicle currency environment that impact on the decisions of peripheral countries. First, in their consumption of third country goods, they must undertake two foreign exchange transactions, accepting the bid price of their own currency, and paying the ask price of currency 1 for the third country currency. Second, this involves a delay, which is costly because agents discount future utility. Finally, it also involves a cost due to country 1 money growth, as country 1 in ation will reduce the real value of their currency 1 money holdings over time.
As in the previous section, m ii = m i = 1 and p i = 1=y i for all i 6 = 1. Also, a country i's holdings of currency i are equal to the sum of the expenditures on goods. However, because the expenditures on other peripheral countries' goods occur with one period delay, as explained above, the condition (3.9) needs to be modi ed. In Appendix A, we provide this modi cation and show the following results for country i (6 = 1):
Recall that = N 1 + 1= > N 1. Expression (4.7) shows that for < 1, a peripheral country i will devote a greater share of its budget to the domestic good that under STE, since ceteris paribus, commodities j 6 = f1; ig become more expensive, as described below.
Condition (4.8) says that whatever country i 6 = 1 does not spend on its home good, it brings to the 1i trading post to obtain currency 1. Condition (4.9) gives the amount of currency 1 brought to the 1j trading post (j 6 = i). This is determined by the price that country i received for its sales of currency i, in the previous period; i.e. s For country 1, optimal consumption is chosen in the same manner as under the STE:
Because other countries hold currency 1 between periods, however, it is no longer true that m 11 = m 1 (= 1). In fact, since m 11 + P i6 =1 m i1 = 1, it must be the case that:
The level of consumption of good 1 by country 1 is given by:
Consumption levels of other goods by country 1 can be calculated using (??). Likewise, the amount of currency 1 brought to the 1i post by country 1 is:
To compute the price level, p 1 , notice that the cash in advance constraint on currency 1 binds for country 1. Using this fact and the fact 1 = ( 1 1)= 1 , we rewrite the constraint (3.1) for i = 1 as follows:
Thus, country 1's normalized price level is in uenced by the holdings of all other countries of currency 1.
The above analysis also implies that country 1's current account surplus is:
In a steady state, m 11(+1) = m 11 . With a positive growth rate of money, country 1 can run a continual current account de cit by virtue of the fact that all other countries must maintain currency 1 balances.
Trading Posts with a Vehicle Currency
We determine exchange rates in trading post 1i, i > 1, as follows. In a period, country i Then, the ask and bid prices of currency i are determined by:
We focus on a steady state where i is constant over time for all i. Then, all real variables and all normalized nominal variables are constant over time. In the steady state,the above conditions in the currency market and the condition (4.12) yield the following results (see Appendix A):
where
Then, the bid-ask spread in the 1i market is:
From this, we may establish the following proposition (see Appendix B for a proof):
Proposition 4.1. The bid-ask spread between currency 1 and all other currencies is lower when currency 1 is the vehicle currency than in an STE. Moreover, the bid-ask spread is increasing in 1 .
It is intuitive that the bid-ask spread is lower when all other countries use currency 1 for foreign exchange trading. In a VCE, each peripheral country needs currency 1 to exchange for all other non-vehicle foreign currencies. Thus, the deliveries of all other currencies to currency 1 trading posts must be larger than in an STE. 8 It is also true that the deliveries of currency 1 to each trading post is higher, because both country 1 and all other country residents will wish to exchange currency 1 to purchase other peripheral country goods.
8 More precisely, the fraction of any currency i > 1 supplied to the 1i post is equal to
(N 2) , which is greater than that supplied in the STE, i.e. 1= .
The high volumes on both sides of each post reduce the average cost of trading and hence reduce the bid-ask spread.
There is a second, more indirect factor reducing the bid-ask spread, however. Because some currency 1 is held by j > 1 countries, the normalized price level in country 1 is lower than it would be in the symmetric equilibrium. As a result, the xed cost of setting up a post in terms of good 1, p 1 y 1 1 , is less than 1 . This raises the bid price of all other currencies against currency 1, reducing the bid-ask spread.
While the bid-ask spread is lower in the economy with a vehicle currency, it is raised by makes it clear that for an equal rise in m 11 , the bid exchange rate will fall by more than the ask exchange rate, so the bid-ask spread is widened by higher country 1 money growth.
E ects of the Vehicle Currency on E ciency and Resource Allocations
The VCE enhances world e ciency in the sense that, with less resources used up in trading posts, there are more of all goods i > 1 available for consumption, and the same amount of good 1. For large N , this e ciency gain can be substantial. On the other hand, the presence of the vehicle currency introduces a fundamental asymmetry into the allocation of world resources. Country 1 occupies a special role as a provider of the vehicle currency. We now analyze these implications of the vehicle currency on e ciency and resource allocations.
Consider the VC country rst. Using the expression for m 11 in (4.18), we can solve for the price level of good 1 as:
Then, from (4.7) and (4.13), we solve country 1's consumption levels as:
To compare these consumption levels with those in the STE, consider the special case where 1 = 1 and = 1. In this case, country 1's consumption of good 1 is the same as in the STE. But consumption of good i > 1 exceeds that of the STE equilibrium because
This exceeds consumption under the STE for two reasons. First, the denominator shows that the average costs of a 1i trading post is lower, since a larger fraction of currency i is traded at this post. Secondly, the numerator captures the fact that country 1 receives a higher price for its currency s a 1i , than in the STE.
More generally, we establish the following proposition (see Appendix B for a proof):
Proposition 4.2. Consumption levels of the VC country increase in 1 . For all 1 
1,
welfare of residents of the VC country always exceed those under the STE.
For the peripheral countries, we can use a similar procedure to calculate consumption.
Hence, for i 6 = 1:
(4.27) From (4.25), we nd that consumption of the home good is higher in the VCE than in the STE, so long as < 1. Because consumption of other peripheral country goods requires waiting one period, and there is discounting, consumers will substitute towards the home good.
Consumption of good 1 by country i > 1 is at most equal to that under STE, for all
. But higher country 1 money growth reduces consumption in a vehicle currency equilibrium.
Consumption of other peripheral country's goods may be greater or less than that under STE. In the special case where 1 = 1 and = 1, we may express c ij as:
The peripheral countries face a basic trade-o , evident in (4.28). In order for country i to consume country j's good (where i 6 = j, i; j > 1), the country must rst sell its own currency at the 1i trading post, and then, in the next period, purchase currency j at the 1j trading post. Hence, consumption of other peripheral country goods is subject to the bid-ask spread implied by both these trades. This is re ected in the rst expression in (4.28), which is less than unity. On the other hand, relative to the STE, the reduction in the average cost of the 1j trading posts tends to increase c ij . This is captured by the second expression in (4.28). The second factor becomes more important, the higher is N .
If the cost of setting up a trading post is the same for all posts, then (4.28) implies that
ST E ij
as N > (=) 3. Finally, looking back at the general case, it is evident from (4.27) that c i1 is decreasing in 1 . Also, since the bid-ask spread increases in 1 , then (4.26) implies that c ij decreases in 1 , where j = 2 f1; ig.
We summarize this discussion in the following proposition: A rise in 1 however, still shrinks these gains. Figure 2 shows that, for a center country money growth rate equal to 5 percent, peripheral countries will lose under VCE relative to STE, for N less than 10.
An interesting feature that arises in Figure 2 is that the e ect of N on the gains from a vehicle currency may be non-monotonic. When 1 > 0; increasing N initially leads the peripheral country to lose, relative to STE. As N continues to increase, this e ect is reversed, and welfare is higher under VCE relative to STE. Intuitively, as we increase the number of countries, in the case = 1, each country becomes more open, since in this case preferences are assumed equally weighted towards all country's goods. Hence, each peripheral country is more exposed to country 1 money growth. Thus, the losses from adopting a vehicle currency tends to rise, as N increases. O setting this however, is the fundamental e ciency of a vehicle currency, leading to a greater welfare gains, the greater the number of bilateral trading posts that are closed down by its adoption. For small N , the rst force tends to dominate, and increasing numbers tends to reduce the gains to a vehicle currency. For larger N , the second force is predominant, and the gains to a vehicle currency begin to rise and become positive.
An alternative parameterization is shown in Figure 3 . There, we assume that = 1=(N 1), which ensures that the share of the budget spent on foreign goods remains at 0:5, whatever the number of countries. In this case, the non-monotonic characteristic of the gains from a vehicle currency is much less pronounced, since intuitively, increasing the number of countries does not increase the exposure to currency 1 in ation as much as the case where = 1.
Robustness of the Vehicle Currency Equilibrium
In addition to the STE and the VCE analyzed in previous sections, there are many other equilibria in the model. For example, other currencies can also be the vehicle currency. Such multiplicity is inevitable when there are xed costs of organizing the currency exchange.
Moreover, much of the multiplicity is robust to the re nements of trembling hands by a small measure of agents or of evolutionary stability. 10 Such robustness illustrates the fact that, once a currency has established itself as the vehicle currency, a large disturbance is needed to dethrone it.
In this section we examine whether the VC equilibrium is robust to the following two deviations by a large number of agents. The rst is a deviation by all households in two countries to trading their currencies directly. We call this deviation a bilateral deviation.
The second is a deviation by all households in all peripheral countries to using a di erent currency as the vehicle currency. We show that, for a vehicle currency to survive these deviations, its in ation rate and its xed trading cost cannot be too high.
Let us rst consider a bilateral deviation by two countries, say, country 2 and country 3. Suppose that all households in the two countries deviate to trading the two currencies directly. Other countries do not participate in the 23 post. Moreover, countries 2 and 3 still supply their domestic currencies to trade for currency 1 and use currency 1 to get other peripheral currencies. However, country 2 does not use currency 1 to buy currency 3, and country 3 does not use currency 1 to buy currency 2.
Denote I = f1; 2; 3g. For a country i = 2 f2; 3g, the decision problem is the same as in the VCE characterized in the previous section, because all currency posts which the country participated before are still active after the above deviation. Since the decision problems of a household in country 2 and of a household in country 3 are similarly, we only formulate the problem for country 2.
With the deviation, a household in country 2 faces the following constraints involving Other constraints that the household faces, such as the cash in advance constraints in the goods markets, are the same as those in the previous section.
Because country 2 still needs currency 1 to exchange for other currencies, the cash in advance constraint on currency 1 in the goods market does not bind for country 2, as in the previous section. All other cash in advance constraints bind. Then, the household's optimal choices yield:
As before, m 22 = m 2 = 1, m j2 = 0 (j 6 = 2), and p 2 = 1=y 2 . Adding up country 2's spending of currency 2 and substituting the rst-order conditions for c yields:
The household's consumption levels of other goods can be calculated accordingly. Also, for j = 2 I, the household's optimal decisions on the quantities of currency trade yield: 
The bid-ask spread at the 23 post is smaller than that in the STE, provided N > 3. This is because, when < 1, countries 2 and 3 will assign a higher fraction of their budget to each other's good that they will to other periperal country goods, given that the consumption of those other goods requires a one-period delay in consumption.
In the analysis below, j = 2 I unless it is speci ed otherwise. To compute exchange rates at the 12 post and the 13 post after the deviation by countries 2 and 3, we count the total amount of currency 1 that is held by the peripheral countries at the beginning of a period as follows:
The second equality comes from the fact that m 31 = m 21 and that m j1 is the same for all j = 2 I. Substituting (5.2) for m 21 and (4.10) for m j1 yields:
With modi cation of m 11 , a country 1 household's optimal choices of consumption are still given by (4.11) and (4.13), the amount of currency trade by (4.14), and the price level of good 1 by (4.15). 
Here we used the fact that f We can express this condition as follows:
Under this condition, the deviation described above makes country 2 households worse o .
11 Similarly, the deviation makes country 3 worse o if (5.11), with 3 being replaced with 2 , is satis ed.
The following proposition extends the above analysis to general values of 1 (see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 5.1. Assume 1 < , where is de ned as
Also assume that is su ciently close to 1. Then there exists 1 2 (1; 1) such that, i 1 < 1 , the VC equilibrium is robust to joint deviations by all households in any two countries to a direct exchange of the two countries' currencies.
This proposition is intuitive. High growth rates of the vehicle currency reduce the peripheral countries' consumption. When this money growth rate passes a critical level, the loss to the peripheral countries exceeds the gain from the economy of scale of using a vehicle currency in the exchange market. In this case, the peripheral countries can be better o by trading currencies bilaterally. Because the center country will lose when its currency ceases to be a vehicle currency, the potential deviation by the peripheral countries puts an upper bound on the money growth of the vehicle currency.
11 In fact, we can show that, in the special case where and 1 approach 1, the deviation does not change country 2's consumption level of any good except good 3. That is, c 2j = (c 2j ) V C for all j 6 = 3, where the subscripts V C indicate the levels in the VCE before the deviation. However, the deviation does change country 2's consumption level of good 3. It can be veri ed that the ratio of consumption of good 3 by a country 2 household in the VCE relative to the level after the deviation, Thus, for all N > 3, the condition 1 < is satis ed if all currencies have the same trading cost. The condition can be satis ed even if the vehicle currency has a higher cost than other currencies. Figure 4 describes the utility gains from a deviation by country 2 (or country 3) using the same calibration as in Figures 1-2 , as a function of the country 1 rate (gross) in ation rate 1 . With 1 = 1, there is no gain to deviating, as we have shown in Proposition 5.1.
But as in ation rises, the utility gain to a deviation by any two countries increases. As 
A Vehicle Currency with Two Rounds of Currency Trading per Period
In the Vehicle Currency Equilibrium of section 4, peripheral countries must carry amounts of the vehicle currency from one period to the next, exposing them to losses from vehicle currency in ation, as well as from time discounting. We now allow for two rounds of currency trading in every period. This means that peripheral countries can avoid carrying over the vehicle currency across periods, eliminating both of these welfare losses. Nevertheless, they still cannot avoid the need to`trade twice' in order to consume other peripheral country goods.
Now let the currency trading session within each period be broken into two rounds; A and B. There are a number of ways to allow currency trading within each round, and for each country. In any con guration, country i > 1 must sell currency i in the rst round of trading. But it may wish to sell more of its own currency in the second round, in order to nance purchases of good 1. Its choices will depend on equilibrium exchange rates. Country 1 has more options. It needs to buy currencies j > 1, but it could do this in the rst round or the second round. Country 1 is not obliged to participate in both rounds. Again its choices will depend on the exchange rate.
In equilibrium, the choices of country 1 and the peripheral countries must be consistent with one another. Hence, it is clear that in any con guration of equilibrium, country 1 must sell currency 1 in the rst round, if each country i > 1 is to have money to nance consumption of goods j 6 = i; 1 in the second round. Similarly either country 1 or peripheral countries must o er all currencies j 6 = 1 for sale in round B, so that other peripheral countries can use currency 1 to purchase these currencies. This still allows for a number of possible trading equilibria. In Appendix D, we discuss alternative possibilities.
Here however, we focus on an equilibrium trading con guration which has the following characteristics; a) in Round A, each peripheral country i (6 = 1) trades currency i for currency 1 (i.e. the vehicle currency), and b) in round B, country i sells currency 1 for currency j (6 = i), and again sells currency i for currency 1, and c) country 1 purchases all currencies i 6 = 1 in round A, and sells some of these currencies in round B. In fact, this trading pattern o ers the best chance for the peripheral countries to gain from the vehicle currency, relative to other con gurations of two-round trading (see Appendix D).
The changes in the constraints facing a household in country 1, relative to the one-round trading environment, are as follows: (Note that I deleted four constraints here because three repeat the ones in the one-round trading and the other one does not bind.) The household continues to face the constraints (3.1), (3.2) and (3.6), with i = 1.
In the two rounds described above, a household in country 1 delivers f is determined residually from the equilibrium equations.
In this equilibrium, country 1's optimality conditions satisfy:
1 ; (6.3)
Here, as before, all cash in advance constraints in the goods market facing a country 1's household bind. This means that m 1j = 0, so that, by (6.2), f 1jB 1j
is determined residually by the currency j that is not used for purchases of good j. In trading o consumption between goods 1 and good j, country 1 faces the round A ask price for currency j. Because a household in a peripheral country i can now obtain other peripheral currencies in one period by going through the two rounds of trade, it is not necessary for the household to hold the vehicle currency from one period to the next. In fact, it is not optimal to do so, provided that (gross) rates of growth of these currencies exceed the discount factor. This implies that a household always spends all foreign currencies on goods before a period ends.
That is, all cash in advance constraints in the goods market now bind including the one involving the vehicle currency.
Assume s bA 1i < s bB 1i , which will be shown to hold. The optimality choices of a country i 6 = 1 household generate the following results:
As in the VCE, m ii = 1. Also, country i (6 = 1) must face the bid price at trading post 1i and the ask price at post 1j in order to consume good j, (j 6 = i; 1). But now both trades take place within the period. In Round B, the 1j trading post yields:
1 : (6.14)
In Appendix D, we solve the exchange rates as follows:
These solutions are enough to determine consumption rates for all countries. In particular, because all cash in advance constraints bind, consumption of the local good is identical to that under the STE:
For country 1, consumption of periphery goods is determined by s bB 1j (= s aA 1j ):
For the peripheral countries, consumption of good 1 is determined simply by s bB 1j :
Consumption of good j (6 = i, 1), however, is constrained by the bid-ask spread. As before, assume that i = j , i; j > 1. Then, In the equilibrium with two rounds of currency trade, it requires at least 7 countries to ensure gains from a vehicle currency, for peripheral countries. With two rounds of trade, peripheral countries face a less advantageous relative price of currency, because relative to the VCE of the previous section, in round A, currency 1 is now supplied only by country 1. This leads to a much lower round A bid price for currency j > 1, reducing the bid-ask spread facing these countries.
Note that the equilibrium under two rounds of trade is independent of country 1 money growth and the subjective discount factor. Peripheral countries are not exposed to country 1 in ation, since they no longer hold currency 1 across periods. Nor do they bear a welfare cost of waiting. But they su er in a di erent way; from much reduced terms of trade (as well as costs of more trading posts). In general, they tend to be worse o in a steady state with two rounds of trading relative to the VCE of the previous section.
Conclusions
This paper has developed a model in which a globally acceptable currency can arise en- If in ation in the center country goes to high, then our robustness analysis suggests that 37 the use of the vehicle currency will collapse.
The model could be extended in a number of ways. We could allow for uncertainty in money growth and output levels. In this case, the risk-hedging properties of a vehicle currency would be important, in addition to its exchange use. We could do a more explicit welfare analysis of monetary policy, assuming a social planner that weights each countries utility and can make monetary transfers across countries. We leave these issues for future research.
Appendix
A. Derivations for Sections 3 and 4
First, we derive (3.7) and (3.8). Let the current-value Lagrangian multiplier be ii for (3.1), ij for (3.2), ii for (3.3), ij for (3.4) and (3.5), and ij for (3.6). De ne ij = if j 6 = i and ij = 1 if j = i. With the logarithmic utility function, the rst-order conditions for c ij and m 0 ij yield the following result for all i and j:
where the subscript +1 indicates the next period. The rst-order conditions for f ij ii (i < j) and f ji ii (i > j) yield:
Dividing (A.1) for j 6 = i by the condition for j = i, and using (A.2), we obtain (3.7) and (3.8). Second, we derive (4.5) and (4.6). Let the current-value Lagrangian multiplier be ii for (4.1), ij for (4.2), i1 for (4.3), and i1 for (4.4). As in the STE, the multiplier is ii for (3.1), ij for (3.2), and ij for (3.6). It is easy to verify that the rst-order conditions for c ij and m The envelope conditions for m ij are:
Substituting the last condition into (A.4) yields ij = s a 1j i1 for all j 6 = i; 1. Dividing (A.1) for j = 1 by (A.1) for j = 1, and using (A.3), we obtain (4.5).
To establish (4.6), we show that i1 = 0 for all i 6 = 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that i1 > 0. Then, m 0 i1 = p 1 c i1 , and so m i1(+1) = 0 by (3.2). With (4.4), this further implies f 1j i1(+1) = 0 for all j 6 = i. That is, the household will have no foreign currency in the next period. As a result, consumption of foreign goods will be zero. This is not optimal since the marginal utility of such consumption is in nite when consumption is zero.
Since i1 = 0, (A.1) implies i1(+1) = i1 1(+1) = . Then, for all j 6 = i; 1, we have:
The rst equality comes from a result derived above, the second equality is obvious, and the last equality comes from (A.3). Now, dividing (A.1) for j 6 = i; 1 in the next period by (A.1) for j = i in the current period, and using the above condition, we get (4.6). Third, we derive the results (4.7) { (4.10). To do so, consider a household in a country i 6 = 1. Notice that the household spends the domestic currency in the current period to acquire currency 1 and to purchase domestic good. Part of currency 1 that the household acquires today is spent on good 1. The rest will be spent in the next period to purchase other peripheral currencies which, in turn, will be spent on goods of these peripheral countries. Thus, the household's holdings of domestic currency at the beginning of the period are equal to the sum of current expenditures on good 1 and domestic good and expenditures in the next period on goods of other peripheral countries. This constraint is as follows: Notice that the second condition implies that s b 1i is independent of i. Thus, (4.12) can be simpli ed to (4.18). Substituting m 11 from (4.18) into the above two equations and focusing on the steady state, we obtain (4.19) and (4.20). Thus, a su cient condition for the VC country's consumption levels to be higher in the VCE than in the STE is that they are so in the case 1 = 1. When 1 = 1, we have c 11 = y 1 =( ), which is equal to the level in the STE. However, when 1 = 1, c 1i (i 6 = 1) is given as follows: Since the numerator is greater than (1 i )y i and the denominator is less than , the above consumption level is greater than that in the STE. Therefore, the VC country's welfare is higher in the VCE than in the STE.
C. Proofs for Section 5
We derive bid/ask prices at each post that involves currency 1. Denote: (1 )(N 2) ;
where z 2 fa; bg. Also, j = 2 f1; 2; 3g unless indicated otherwise. Substituting the quantities of currencies brought to the posts involving currency 1 from (4.8), (4.9), (4.14) and (5.1) into (5.6) { (5.9), we solve exchange rates as follows: Proof of Proposition 5.1.
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To prove Proposition, we compute the consumption levels in the VCE relative to the ones after the deviation. Use the subscript V C to indicate the levels in the VCE. Then, This is a decreasing function of 1 . Now we compare the utility level of country 2 before and after the deviation. Denote ( 1 ) = (U 2 ) V C U 2 . With logarithmic utility functions, the above properties of the consumption ratios imply that ( 1 ) decreases in 1 . It can be veri ed that (1) = 1, and so the deviation is pro table to countries 2 and 3 if 1 is su ciently large. On the other hand, when 1 = 1, we can verify that c 2j = (c 2j ) V C and c 21 = (c 21 ) V C . In addition, This ratio is greater than one, and hence (1) > 0, i (5.11) is satis ed. Because ( 1 ) decreases in 1 , then there exists a critical level of 1 such that the deviation makes countries 2 and 3 worse o if and only if 1 is below this critical level.
Extending the above analysis to allow for a deviation by any arbitrary pair of countries, we establish Proposition 5.1.
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D. Proofs for Section 6
We derive (6.15) { (6.17). Substituting f 1jA jj from (6.11) into (6.12), we obtain: and f 1jB i1 from (6.3), (6.10) and (6.11) into (6.13). Re-arranging the result yields (6.17).
Proof of Proposition 6.1 to be written.
Other con gurations of two rounds of trade per period to be written. 
